Multilevel modelling techniques are applied to a dataset that matches ®rms and workers, to pinpoint and explain contrasts among company wage policies. Results indicate that wage dierences across ®rms are statistically signi®cant, aecting every parameter of the pay policy (returns to schooling, tenure, experience, the penalty imposed on newly hired workers and on women). Gross labour productivity, average schooling in the ®rm, ®rm size and economic sector are relevant forces shaping the contrast between employers' pay policies.
federations and trade unions' associations, points towards some centralization in the system. Also, the impact of union action goes beyond union membership, as there are widespread extension mechanisms at work, in particular once employers apply an agreement signed with a trade union to all of their workforce, irrespective of the worker's union membership status. On the other hand, some decentralization is provided by the scattered nature of the union structure, and by the possibility of bargaining at the ®rm level. Moreover, wage drift has been steadily increasing in the Portuguese economy, allowing employers to adjust their wage policy to the ®rm's conditions.
From a methodological point of view,`employer wage eects' have almost invariably been evaluated as the coecients of employer dummy variables, in a wage regression where controls for worker characteristics have been introduced (see for example the papers by Groshen, 1991; Leonard, 1989; Lucifora, 1993; or Knight and Sabot, 1983) . This study aims at going beyond the traditional approach of reducing ®rm wage eects to an employerspeci®c intercept in the wage regression. That approach provides one unambiguous measure of the ®rm wage eect, which can be regressed on the ®rm attributes to explain why some ®rms pay better than others. As such, it has yielded interesting insights into employers pay policies and has facilitated the analysis of its causes. However, it is too restrictive, as it disregards that dierent ®rms may value the human capital attributes of their workers dierently. That is more so, the further the labour market is from a perfectly competitive mechanism. Furthermore, a particular assumption concerning the mechanism of wage bargaining within the ®rm is implicit. It presumes that ®rm-wide trade unions bargain for every worker in the ®rm, extracting in the end a uniform reward, beyond the returns on the worker's human capital, which holds for every worker in the company. A dierent mechanism is instead likely to operate in most countries, and in particular in Portugal, where negotiation is often fragmented, especially in the services sector where occupation-based unions predominate. Workers with dierent characteristics are thus likely to be able to gain dierent shares of the economic rents to be divided.
Therefore, employers' wage policies will be modelled as employer-speci®c intercepts and slopes in the wage regression, and tests on the equality of parameters across ®rms will be performed. Some progress in this direction had been made by Kramarz et al. (1996) when estimating a separate wage regression for each ®rm. However, the model to be used should not just allow for the estimation of ®rm-speci®c coecients, enabling the identi®cation of contracts among company wage policies. A more demanding objective would be to explain that multidimensional set of employer wage eects, detecting the sources of wage variability across ®rms. Moreover, both steps of the estimation process should ideally be joined, in one estimation framework. Multilevel modelling will be used. This type of model provides, furthermore, a more adequate description of the mechanisms actually taking place in the labour market, an issue that will deserve further comment in the next section.
The multilevel model to be used is described in Section 2. Section 3 concentrates on the dispersion of wage parameters across ®rms. Sections 4 and 5 both search for the causes of contrasts among company wage policies. In Section 4, the variability in the wage parameters across ®rms is modelled as a function of the ®rm characteristics, therefore identifying systematic components in company wage policies. In Section 5, the random wage variation across employers is modelled as a function of worker attributes. Section 6 presents conclusions. Hierarchical or multilevel models explicitly handle situations where the group-varying parameters estimated in one level are treated as the dependent variables in the next level equations. The multidimensional set of estimated ®rm-speci®c wage parameters are modelled as random eects with systematic components, thus joining both steps of the estimation process.
ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURE TO ESTIMATE EMPLOYER-SPECIFIC EFFECTS IN
The foundations for linear hierarchical models or multilevel models have been laid down by Lindley and Smith (1972) , who proposed a Bayes estimator for hierarchical data models with complex error structures, highlighting its low dispersion, re¯ected in a low mean squared error. This modelling approach has been advocated in particular by Haitovsky (1986) , responsible for the development to k-level hierarchical models.
Consider two dierent levels making up the particular model of this study. In the ®rst level, the unit of observation is the worker:
with the subscript i referring to the worker, j to his/her ®rm; y is the log of hourly earnings; X includes K regressors (the worker attributes and the constant term), and e j % N0Y s 2 j . The level-2 model explains the b j coecients estimated in the ®rst level, based on l ®rm-level variables:
where j keeps its meaning, referring to the ®rm; G j I K g j and g j is an l Â 1 matrix of ®rm attributes; Z is a kl Â 1 matrix with the coecients of the impact of the ®rm attributes on each of its pay parameters; a j % N0Y G, G being a K Â K matrix; a j is independent of e j . b j is thus made up of a systematic/®xed component G j ÁZ and a random component (a j ). Note in particular that the ®xed component depends on the ®rm attributes. Merging models (1) and (2) yields:
The ®xed part of the model, given by the ®rst term on the right-hand side of equation (3), describes the average wage in the economy, given attributes X ij and G j . The coecients a j describe employer deviations from the economy's standard, and e ij captures worker deviations from his or her employer average wage. The random part, split into two components, embodies particular characteristics of this type of model. In fact, the presence of more than one residual term is a characteristic of multilevel models, and in this case two levels Ð the worker and the ®rm Ð of random variation are allowed for. Moreover, the variance of the error terms can itself be modelled. In particular the error term can be heteroscedastic, and correlation within the ®rm is allowed for, as opposed to traditional OLS estimation where one single random term is considered, assumed usually to have constant variance. If the ®rm-speci®c parameters b j did not depend on the ®rm attributes, then they would be drawn from a distribution with mean b, and the level-2 model in equation (2) would simplify to:
Equation (3) would in that case become
THE DISPERSION OF WAGE PARAMETERS ACROSS FIRMS
Consider equation (3 H ). A general to speci®c modelling approach was followed in the estimation of the model. 3 Successive testing led to the selection of the variables kept in the ®xed part of the model, and of the elements in the covariance matrix G. Variables were dropped from the general model, one at a time, before progressing to the next round of testing. To check the signi®cance of the variance and covariance terms, a t-statistic test is known to be inadequate, as its distributional assumptions are less likely to be met. Instead, the likelihood-ratio test is the proper procedure (see for instance Woodhouse et al., 1996 , p. 32 or Longford, 1993 . Such testing has been performed, at the 1% signi®cance level. The speci®c model reached is reported in Table I .
To clarify the interpretation of the results, let us keep in mind that the estimation process provides estimates for:
. The ®xed parameters, b: the average estimated value in the economy for the pay parameters.
These coecients are reported in the ®rst panel of Table I . . The random parameters: estimates of the elements of the matrix G (a K Â K matrix). The elements of the matrix provide the variances and covariances of the pay parameters, reported in the second panel of the table.
The average rate of return to one extra year of schooling is 6 . 1%, a value in line with previous estimates of wage regressions, in particular for the Portuguese case (see, for example, Vieira et al., 1997) . A point to be noted is the fact that, while an additional year of seniority with the ®rm leads to a wage raise of 0 . 6%, newcomers to the ®rm (less than a year of seniority) are subject to a wage penalty of 5 . 2%. Testing by Vieira et al. (1997) had also pointed to the linearity of the tenure pro®le, after accounting for the wage dierential during the ®rst year with the ®rm. This ®nding may re¯ect the situation of workers on short-term contracts, whose duration is most often set at six months. An extra year of labour market 
4.
Source: Computations based on Portugal, MESS, DE (1992) .
WAGE DIFFERENTIALS ACROSS FIRMS
experience is associated with a wage gain of 0 . 6%. The gender wage gap is captured by the coecient of À0 . 21 on the female dummy variable. Consider now the variation of wage parameters across ®rms. There is signi®cant variability across ®rms in the way they reward the attributes of their workers Ð schooling, tenure, labour market experience, as well as the penalty imposed on women and newcomers to the ®rm Ð as proved by the signi®cance of the level-2 variance of each of the slopes. The wage slopes can therefore by no means be considered as a economy-wide standard, since employers do not follow a universal market rule to reward the characteristics of their workers. Instead, dierences in pay parameters across ®rms are signi®cant. Testing this model against the speci®cation most often found in the literature, which disregards the variability of the pay parameters across ®rms, leads to a chi-squared statistic of 2101 . 2, highlighting that the variation of pay parameters across ®rms should by no means be disregarded.
MODELLING THE FIRM-SPECIFIC WAGE PARAMETERS
Let us now turn to the explanation of the pattern of wage dierences across ®rms. Referring to equation (2), the impact of the ®rm attributes on the way it rewards the characteristics of its workers is captured by the estimated parameters Z. This section therefore concentrates on the systematic components of the ®rm-speci®c wage eects.
Adopting again a general-to-speci®c modelling approach, a wide set of ®rm attributes was included in the initial regression to undertake successive testing. Chi-squared tests were used to check the appropriateness of an employer characteristic to explain all the six parameters in the wage regression, and a variable signi®cant for the explanation of at least one pay parameter was kept in the speci®cation for every other pay parameter. Adopting the same speci®cation enables direct comparison of the impact of an employer attribute across its pay parameters. Regarding the variance and covariance matrix, only the elements tested as signi®cant at the 1% level, according to the likelihood ratio test, were kept in the speci®c version of the model reported in Table II. Further speci®cation tests led to the rejection of the hypothesis of homoscedasticity of the level-1 residuals, in favour of a model where those residuals are a function of the ®rm size, z j :
The normality assumption is not rejected (the Shapiro±Francia test statistic is 0 . 87695, with z 0X03 and a signi®cance level of 0 . 488, in our sample of 36313 observations). The estimation results are reported below. The much-discussed impact of the ®rm size on earnings seems to operate through the returns paid to labour market experience and schooling. Indeed, larger ®rms value more the human capital acquired by their workers in the educational system and their general labour market experience (note the magnitude and signi®cance of the estimated coecients in Table II ). DE (1992) .
WAGE DIFFERENTIALS ACROSS FIRMS
The gross productivity of the ®rm (sales volume per employee) can proxy the size of the rents to be divided between workers and employers. According to Currie and McConnell (1992, pp. 300±301) , ®rms with higher sales are more able to pay, have more to loose once a strike happens, and will therefore have a dierent threat point, being more likely to concede a higher wage. In particular, they reward better the labour market experience of their workforce.
Consider now the impact of the average schooling in the ®rm. Firms with a better schooled labour force reward better the schooling and labour market experience of their workers. This pattern would be in line with sorting theories, according to which the quality of a worker has an impact on the productivity of his or her co-workers (see, for example, the model by Kremer, 1993) . Having schooled co-workers makes everyone more productive, raising the ®rm's wage level. Another interpretation could highlight that high-paying ®rms attract better workers. Firms that reward the schooling achievement of the labour force well attract more schooled workers.
Economic sector bounds are relevant in the explanation of each of the ®rm's pay parameters. In fact, manufacturing rewards the schooling and the experience of the labour force better than services. Also, ®rms in manufacturing do not impose such a wage disadvantage on their newly hired workers. On the other hand, tenure wage progression is slower in manufacturing, and women earn lower wages than in services. In manufacturing, the split between fringe (newcomers) and core workers is more subtle than in services, as revealed by the lower wage disadvantage imposed on newcomers and the¯atter tenure progression scheme. The services sector, instead, is more segmented between newly hired workers and the stable core, whose longer attachment to the ®rm is rewarded/promoted by higher wages (steeper tenure-wage pro®le than in manufacturing).
Apart from the variables that were included in the ®nal model, the exclusion of other variables, a-priori expected to be relevant, also deserves a comment. In particular, institutional forces represented by the type of collective bargaining mechanism revealed not to have a signi®cant impact on wages, after other variables had been taken into consideration.
MODELLING THE VARIANCE OF WAGES ACROSS FIRMS
This section concentrates on modelling the random wage variability across ®rms. Since random employer-speci®c slopes are considered, the random term in the model includes an employer component (X H ij Áa j ), besides the worker component. The wage variance across employers therefore presents a complex structure, being equal to X ij ÁGÁX H ij , a quadratic function of the independent variables X ij .
Plotting the between-®rm wage variance, X ij ÁGÁX H ij , against each worker attribute can help explore its pattern. The impact of each variable on the variance at level-2 is evaluated ceteris paribus, holding every other variable constant at its mean value.
Wage dispersion across ®rms is particularly pronounced for workers with high levels of schooling (see Figure 1) . The contrasts among employers when rewarding high levels of schooling may result from the fact that the productive use of a schooling diploma may vary sharply depending on its subject area. Also, the Portuguese educational system has frequently been criticized for providing weak technical preparation, supplying instead workers with a general background, whose productive use may vary sharply across employers. Particular aspects of the wage bargaining process in the country can also be highlighted. Indeed, collective bargaining is extensively applied, setting minimum wage levels for dierent categories of workers. However, wage drift is widespread, as certain ®rms pay wages above those set by collective bargaining. Note however that wage drift is a selective mechanism, applied mainly to highly skilled and white-collar workers, as revealed by Aperta et al. (1994) . The results in Figure 1 are consistent with this framework in the Portuguese labour market, where wage drift helps shape wage contrasts among ®rms for workers holding higher schooling levels.
Though the same pattern of wage variation across ®rms holds for the worker tenure, its pro®le is¯atter and it does not reach values as high as those generated by schooling (see Figure 2) . Dierent ®rms therefore seem to attach dierent relevance to the speci®c human capital acquired within the company. For the ®rms that encourage long-term employment relationships by rewarding tenure, turnover eciency wage theories could apply, if for example training costs were high and turnover were thus costly to the ®rm.
The productive usefulness of human capital acquired on the market place (experience) is valued in a more uniform way by employers than the bene®ts of schooling or tenure. In fact, the returns of experience present a low dispersion across ®rms, when compared to the returns to the other worker attributes (Figure 3 ).
CONCLUSIONS
Multilevel modelling allows a concise treatment of the following issues: dierences in pay policies across ®rms; modelling the ®rm-speci®c parameters of the pay policy; modelling the wage variance across employers.
Results reveal that dierences across employers' pay policies are signi®cant. Moreover, they concern every parameter of the pay policy. The returns to schooling, tenure, labour market experience, as well as the penalty imposed on women and newly-hired workers present signi®cant variability across ®rms. Therefore, contrasts among company wage policies can only partially be captured by a procedure which assumes that ®rms follow a market rule to reward observable human capital, imposing a uniform wage advantage/disadvantage on all of their labour force.
Wage divergence across ®rms rises particularly sharply with the schooling of the workers, re¯ecting the existence of a certain consensus regarding the productive usefulness of low and average schooling levels in the economy, but widely diverging judgements on the productive advantages of higher levels of schooling. The productive use of a school diploma may vary sharply, depending on its subject area. This can also be linked to a criticism often heard about the educational system in Portugal, which focuses on its too general nature and its inability to provide speci®c skills directly usable in the productive process. While some employers may value DE (1992) the ability to learn that high educational levels may provide, others instead seem to consider the productive skills of workers with high schooling levels rather low. There is a particular logic binding together the pay policies of dierent ®rms, as systematic components can be identi®ed in the ®rm-speci®c wage parameters. In particular, ®rms with a more schooled labour force, larger ones, those where gross labour productivity is higher and those in manufacturing reward their workforce better, through higher returns to schooling and experience.
APPENDIX: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Worker Attributes, 1992 
